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Federal Income Taxation
Andrew Todd*
In 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
handed down several opinions involving U.S. federal income tax issues.1
Two of the court’s published opinions address federal income taxation of
conservation easements.2 Conservation easements have been under
significant scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), having
earned a spot on the “Dirty Dozen” list of tax scams in 2019.3 This
Article surveys the two published opinions issued in 2021 involving the
U.S. federal income taxation of conservation easements.
I. INTRODUCTION: TAXATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code), was
amended in 1980 to provide tax benefits in the form of a charitable
contribution deduction for property owners who enter conservation
easements.4 Congress established this tax benefit to aid in preserving
the nation’s rich cultural heritage and vast natural resources at the risk
of providing an opportunity for taxpayer abuse.5
A taxpayer is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction upon
making a qualified conservation contribution.6 A qualified conservation
contribution is the donation (1) of a “qualified real property interest”;
(2) to a “qualified organization”; (3) that is made exclusively for a
*Associate, King & Spalding, Washington, D.C. Arkansas State University (B.S.
Accounting, B.S. Finance, 2013); The University of Alabama (M.B.A., 2019); The
University of Alabama School of Law (J.D., 2019); New York University School of Law
(LL.M., 2020). Member, State Bar of the District of Columbia, Tennessee, and Virginia.
1. For an analysis of the court’s cases involving U.S. federal income taxation during
the prior Survey period, see Nikolai Karetnyi & Ruoxi Zhang, Federal Income Taxation,
11th Circuit Survey, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1185 (2021).
2. TOT Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r (TOT Prop. Holdings II), 1 F.4th 1354 (11th
Cir. 2021); Hewitt v. Comm’r, 21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021).
3. I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-182 (Nov. 12, 2019).
4. S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 9–10 (1980).
5. Id.
6. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), (h)(1).
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conservation purpose; and (4) for which the conservation purpose is
protected in perpetuity.7
First, a “qualified real property interest” may be an entire interest in
real property—excluding mineral rights, a remainder interest in real
property, or a restriction on the use of real property granted in
perpetuity.8 For a real property restriction to be enforceable in
perpetuity, the donor must have a legally enforceable vested right in
the property and the restriction must prevent the donor from using the
property in a manner inconsistent with the restriction’s conservation
purpose.9 Restrictions that expire are insufficient and will disqualify
the conservation contribution as a charitable deduction.10 However,
restrictions which can only be defeated by remote contingencies
unlikely to occur are considered to be “granted in perpetuity.”11
Second, under section 170(h) of the Code, a qualified organization
may be a governmental unit, 12 an entity receiving substantially all of
its support from a governmental unit,13 certain organizations described
in section 501(c)(3) of the Code,14 or organizations controlled by certain
organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code.15 An
organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code is a qualified
organization if (1) more than one-third of such organization’s annual
revenue normally consists of more than one-third of its annual support
from contributions, grants, charitable gifts, membership fees, and
revenues from the performance of its exempt purposes;16 and (2) not

7. Id. at (h)(1).
8. Id. at (h)(2).
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (2022).
10. See id.
11. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(b)(2), (g)(3) (2022).
12. I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(v)–(vi), (h)(3)(A).
13. Id.
14. I.R.C. § (h)(3)(B).
15. Id. An organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code qualifies if it is:
[O]rganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation . . . and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
16. I.R.C. § 170(h)(3)(B)(i) (citing I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)).
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more than one-third of such organization’s annual support comes from
investment income and unrelated business taxable income.17
Next, a qualifying conservation contribution must be made
exclusively for conservation purposes. Conservation purposes may
include: preservation of land for recreational or educational use by the
general public; protection of habitats for wildlife; protection of
ecosystems; preservation of open space for the scenic enjoyment of the
public pursuant to government conservation plans; or the preservation
of certain historically important land or structures.18
Finally, the property’s conservation purpose must be “protected in
perpetuity” for a contribution to be deemed exclusively for conservation
purposes.19 The statute does not define what it means for a conservation
purpose to be protected in perpetuity.20 In the absence of statutory
guidance, the IRS issued regulations outlining what may meet this
requirement. Generally, taxpayers may satisfy this requirement by
providing the donee with a legally enforceable right to prohibit the use
of the property in a manner inconsistent with the conservation
purpose.21
In its regulations, the IRS recognized that circumstances could arise
that may justify extinguishment of a restriction, or that parties may
simply change their mind and wish to terminate the restriction.22 To
address this concern, the regulations allow a restriction to be
terminated by a judicial proceeding and to still be treated as protected
in perpetuity if: (1) the proceeds of any subsequent sale, exchange, or
condemnation “of the property are used by the donee organization in a
manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original
contribution”;23 and (2) the parties agree at the time the restriction is
granted that the donee will be entitled to a portion of any proceeds from
the eventual sale, exchange, or conversion of the property.24 The
amount owed to the donee is the same proportion that the restriction’s
fair market value bears to the unencumbered fair market value of the

17. Id. Unrelated business taxable income generally consists of income from activities
which are not substantially related to the performance of an organization’s tax-exempt
purpose. I.R.C. § 513(a).
18. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4).
19. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A).
20. Id.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
22. Id.
23. Id. at (g)(6)(i).
24. Id. at (g)(6)(ii).
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property.25 This regulation is the subject of the cases examined in the
Article below.
II. TOT PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC V. COMMISSIONER
A. Factual Background
George R. Dixon purchased 2,602 acres of undeveloped real estate in
rural Van Buren County, Tennessee, for approximately $1.9 million in
2005.26 Three years later, Dixon transferred 652 of those acres to two
limited liability companies that he controlled. The transferred acreage
accounted for approximately $486,000 of the original purchase. In
November 2013, the same 652 acres were transferred from Dixon’s two
limited liability companies to TOT Property Holdings, LLC
(Taxpayer).27
After the November 2013 transfer, Taxpayer’s total assets included
the 652 acres of real property and $100 cash.28 On December 10, 2013,
PES Fund VI, LLC purchased a 98.99% ownership interest in Taxpayer
in exchange for $717,200 in cash and assumed the seller’s obligations to
make $322,000 in capital contributions to the Taxpayer, for a total
purchase price of $1,039,200 (the PES Transaction).29
A few weeks later, on December 27, 2013, Taxpayer executed a deed
(the Deed) that granted a conservation easement on nearly the entire
property to Foothills Land Conservancy (Foothills).30 Section 9.1 of the
Deed contained a provision concerning extinguishment of the easement,
providing that the easement could only be terminated by appropriate
judicial proceedings. If the easement was terminated, Foothills would
be entitled to a portion of the proceeds from any termination proceeding
“as determined in accordance with Section 9.2 [of the Deed] or 26 C.F.R.
Section 1.170A-14, if different.”31
Section 9.2 of the Deed prescribed a formula for valuation of the
easement in the event of termination.32 The formula provides that the
value of the easement at the time of extinguishment is calculated by:

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1357.
Id. at 1357–58.
Id. at 1358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2022

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

1257

[M]ultiplying (a) the fair market value of the Property unencumbered
by this Easement (minus any increase in value after the date of this
grant attributable to improvements) by (b) a fraction, the numerator
of which is the value of this Easement at the time of the grant and
the denominator of which is the value of the Property without
deduction of the value of this Easement at the time of this grant.33

Section 9.2 of the Deed concluded with a statement that the parties
“intended that this Section 9.2 be interpreted to adhere to and be
consistent with 26 C.F.R. Section 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).”34 In effect, this
formula subtracts any increase in value attributable to improvements
from any extinguishment proceeds. The reduced value would then be
multiplied by the defined fraction. As a result, the portion of the
extinguishment proceeds that Foothills would receive equals the
easement’s proportionate value of the unencumbered property at the
time of the grant.35
On its partnership tax return for the taxable period ending on
December 31, 2013, Taxpayer reported a charitable contribution via
conservation easement of $6.9 million.36 Upon examination, the IRS
determined that the easement did not qualify for the claimed charitable
contribution deduction and assessed accuracy-related penalties. The
IRS sent the Taxpayer a copy of the revenue agent’s report and a
transmittal letter signed by the examining agent’s immediate
supervisor, an IRS group manager. That letter stated that the “[revenue
agent’s] report explains all proposed adjustments including facts, law,
and conclusion.”37 Approximately two months later, the IRS group
manager who signed the transmittal letter signed a form approving the
civil penalties recommended in the revenue agent’s report.38
The “IRS issued a notice of final partnership administrative
adjustment” (FPAA) to Taxpayer in January 2017, disallowing the
conservation easement deduction and assessing accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662 of the Code.39 The deduction was
disallowed due to Taxpayer’s failure to establish that the deduction met
the statutory requirements or that the value of the deduction was
correct as claimed.40 Taxpayer timely challenged the FPAA by filing a
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1358–59.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1359–60.
Id. at 1360.
Id.
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petition in the tax court (the tax court case name is the same as the
Eleventh Circuit case name).41 The tax court decided three main issues,
holding for the IRS on all three.42
B. Did the Conservation Easement Protect the Conservation Purpose in
Perpetuity?
First, the tax court determined that the valuation formula in section
9.2 of the Deed was inconsistent with regulatory requirements and that
the language in the deed attempting to substitute the preferred formula
with regulatory language was an unenforceable “condition subsequent
savings clause.”43 Thus, according to the tax court, the IRS properly
denied the deduction for charitable contribution of the conservation
easement because the Deed did not protect the conservation purpose in
perpetuity, as required by section 170(h)(5) of the Code.44
The Eleventh Circuit began by considering whether the tax court
properly determined that the Deed did not protect the conservation
purpose of the easement in perpetuity, as required by section 170(h)(5)
of the Code.45 The court first examined whether the allocation formula
in the Deed differed from allocations provided in the Treasury
Regulations.46 Although the Code is silent as to what it means for a
conservation purpose to be protected in perpetuity, the Treasury
Regulations provide guidance by addressing the possibility of
unexpected changes to a property that might undermine its
conservation purpose and establishes specific requirements that must
be included in the property’s deed.47
The regulations require that the donee receive a vested, legally
enforceable property right “with a fair market value that is at least
equal to the proportionate value that the perpetual conservation
restriction at the time of the gift, bears to the value of the property as a
whole at that time”; and that the donee “must be entitled to a portion of
the proceeds at least equal to that proportionate value of the perpetual
conservation restriction” upon the sale, exchange, or involuntary
conversion of the property which extinguishes the easement.48 The
41. Id.; TOT Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r (TOT Prop. Holdings I), No. 5600-17,
2019 WL 11880554, at *3 (T.C. Nov. 22, 2019).
42. TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1360.
43. TOT Prop. Holdings I, 2019 WL 11880554 at *4–6.
44. Id. at *6.
45. TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1362.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) to (ii)).
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court determined that the regulations do not permit any reductions for
the value of improvements such as those contained in the Deed.49
Following an examination of recent case law, the court noted that other
courts had reached the same conclusion.50 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the formula in the Deed did not comply with regulatory
requirements.51
Taxpayer argued that any contradictory language in the Deed was
overridden by the regulation, pointing to the language of sections 9.1
and 9.2 of the Deed.52 According to Taxpayer, these provisions were
interpretive and required the Deed to be construed so that it complied
with the regulations.53
In addressing Taxpayer’s argument, the court discussed the
difference between interpretive provisions and “condition[s] subsequent
savings clauses.”54 Condition subsequent savings clauses “seek to
‘recharacterize the nature of the transaction in the event of a future’
occurrence [and] ‘will be disregarded for federal tax purposes.’”55
Conversely, interpretive clauses will be upheld because they simply
help illustrate and are not dependent upon subsequent adverse action
before being operative.56
The court discussed two Fourth Circuit cases it found helpful in
determining whether clauses are valid interpretive provisions or invalid
savings clauses.57 In Belk v. Commissioner,58 the taxpayers challenged
the disallowance of a deduction for a conservation easement.59 The deed
granting the easement contained a clause stating that the donee “shall
have no right or power to agree to any amendments . . . that would
result in this Conservation Easement failing to qualify . . . as a qualified
conservation contribution under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue

49. Id. at 1363.
50. Id. at 1363–64 (discussing PPBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 900 F.3d 193 (5th
Cir. 2018); then Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 126 (2019)).
51. Id. at 1366.
52. Id. at 1364. Recall, that section 9.1 of the Deed provides that Treasury Regulation
1.170A-14 would apply in determining Foothill’s share of extinguishment proceeds, rather
than section 9.2 of the Deed, “if different.” Id. at 1359. Also recall the language in section
9.2 of the Deed states that the parties intended for that section to be consistent with
Treasury Regulation Section 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). Id. at 1359.
53. Id. at 1364.
54. Id. at 1364–65 (citing Belk v. Comm’r, 774 F.3d 221, 229 (4th Cir. 2014)).
55. Id. at 1364 (quoting Belk, 774 F.3d at 229).
56. Id. (citing Belk, 774 F.3d at 230).
57. Id. at 1365–66.
58. 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014).
59. Id. at 228.
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Code and applicable regulations.”60 The taxpayers in that case argued
that this clause ensured regulatory compliance, notwithstanding actual
noncompliance with section 170(h)(2)(C) of the Code.61
The Fourth Circuit held that the clause was unenforceable because
its operation depended on a future occurrence, effectively asking the
court to void the offending language and preserve the tax benefit absent
any interpretive question in need of clarification.62 According to the
Fourth Circuit, applying the savings clause would “hamper the [IRS’s]
enforcement power,” leading to tax collection “grind[ing] to a halt.”63
In the second case, Commissioner v. Procter,64 the Fourth Circuit
considered whether language in a trust indenture was effective to avoid
the possibility of gift tax.65 In that case, the applicable trust instrument
stated:
[I]n the event it should be determined by final judgment or order of a
competent federal court of last resort that any part of the transfer in
trust hereunder is subject to gift tax, it is agreed by all the parties
hereto that in that event the excess property hereby transferred
which is decreed by such court to be subject to gift tax, shall
automatically be deemed not to be included in the conveyance in
trust hereunder and shall remain the sole property of Frederic W.
Procter free from the trust hereby created.66

The Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the tax court, holding that
the clause was invalid.67 According to the Fourth Circuit, “condition[s]
which involve[] [that] sort of trifling with the judicial process cannot be
sustained.”68 If the clause were to be enforced, it would discourage tax
collection because attempts to collect the tax would result in the tax
being defeated—a lose-lose for the government.69 Accordingly, such a
condition subsequent was contrary to public policy and would not be
enforced.70

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 228–29.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
Id. at 825–26.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 827.
Id.
Id.
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In addition to the cases reviewed from the Fourth Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the tax court had also refused to enforce
such savings clauses.71 Indeed, when confronted with nearly identical
language in a deed just two years earlier, the tax court refused to
enforce a savings clause which would have replaced deficient language
with the regulatory provisions, thereby preserving a tax benefit.72
Armed with these cases, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded to uphold
the tax court’s determination that the savings clause was
unenforceable.73 The formula in section 9.2 of the Deed was clear,
unambiguously providing that the value attributable to improvements
will be subtracted from extinguishment proceeds before allocating such
proceeds to the donee.74 Thus, there was no ambiguity to interpret.75
Absent any ambiguity, the clause’s only function was to nullify the
deficient language and although the clause contemplated application of
the regulatory language, the regulatory language would only apply if it
is “different” from the preferred formula—an “impermissibl[e]
‘countermand [to] the plain text of the [] deed.’”76 Moreover, the
regulatory formula only applied if the IRS or a court subsequently
determined that the preferred formula was deficient, thereby
preventing Foothills’s property right from being “immediately vested”
as required by the regulation.77 Accordingly, the court affirmed the tax
court’s decision upholding the IRS’s disallowance of Taxpayer’s
charitable contribution deduction.78
C. Was the Tax Court’s Valuation of the Easement Clearly Erroneous?
After upholding the tax court’s determination that the Deed did not
satisfy the requirements to preserve the conservation purpose of the
easement in perpetuity, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded to address
Taxpayer’s argument that the tax court’s valuation of the easement was
clearly erroneous.79 Taxpayers generally are liable for an accuracyrelated penalty if certain valuation misstatements result in an
underpayment of federal income tax.80 If a valuation is 150% or more of
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1366.
Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC, 153 T.C. at 144.
TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1374.
Id.at 1367.
Id.
Id. (quoting Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC, 153 T.C. at 141).
Id.
Id.at 1368.
Id.
I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(3).
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the correct value, the misstatement is a “substantial valuation
misstatement” and will result in assessment of a 20% accuracy-related
penalty.81 If the valuation is 200% or more of the correct value, the
misstatement is a “gross valuation misstatement[],” which results in an
assessment of a 40% accuracy-related penalty.82
Because it was confronted with a challenge to an IRS accuracyrelated penalty assessment, the tax court had to determine the correct
value of the easement, which is generally a mixed question of fact and
law.83 However, on appeal, Taxpayer challenged only the tax court’s
factual determinations.84 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s review was
limited to whether the valuation was clearly erroneous. Specifically, the
court had to determine whether the tax court’s determination of the
property’s highest and best use before donation was clearly erroneous.85
Both parties submitted expert evidence regarding the valuation of
the easement and its highest and best use before donation.86 Taxpayer’s
expert determined that the pre-donation highest and best use of the
property was as for “low density destination mountain resort residential
development” and was valued at $3,913,000.87 Post-donation the
highest and best use was for recreation and timber revenue worth
$1,181,000. 88 This resulted in a fair market value of $2,732,000 for the
easement.89 The IRS’s expert determined that the property’s highest

81. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (e)(1)(A).
82. I.R.C. §§ 6662(h)(1), (h)(2)(A)(i).
83. Palmer Ranch Holdings Ltd. v. Comm’r, 812 F.3d 982, 994 (11th Cir. 2016).
84. TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1369.
85. Id. at 1370. Taxpayer’s challenge was limited to the pre donation value of the
easement. Id.
86. Id. at 1370–71. When determining the fair market value of a conservation
easement in the absence of comparable market sales, the “before-and-after” method of
valuation is generally used. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). This method determines the
fair market value of the easement by comparing the “difference between the fair market
value of the property pre and post encumbrance” based on the highest and best use of the
property in each instance. Pine Mtn. Pres. v. Comm’r, 978 F.3d 1200, 1211 (11th Cir.
2020). The highest and best use of a property is one that is a “reasonable and probable use
that supports the highest present value,” focused on “the highest and most profitable use
for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably
near future.” TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1369 (quoting Palmer Ranch, 812 F.3d at
987 (quoting Symington v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 892, 897 (1986))). When the parties propose
different uses, courts consider chances that the property will achieve the proposed use in
the near future, the risk of the use, and hypothetical buyers’ willingness to pay. Id. at
1369–70 (citing Palmer Ranch, 812 F.3d at 1000).
87. TOT Prop. Holdings I, 2019 WL 11880554 at *7.
88. TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1368.
89. Id.
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and best use both before and after donation was for recreation and
timber revenue and that the pre and post-donation values were
$1,128,000 and $632,000, respectively, representing a fair market value
of $496,000 for the easement.90
The tax court found the IRS expert more credible, characterizing
some of the conclusions presented by Taxpayer’s expert as improbable.91
The tax court also noted that other evidence, particularly the PES
Transaction—of which the IRS expert was not aware—corroborated the
IRS expert’s conclusions.92 Accordingly, the tax court adopted the IRS’s
valuation and upheld the assessment of accuracy-related penalties.93
The court concluded that the tax court’s valuation was not clearly
erroneous.94 First, the PES Transaction provided overwhelming support
for the tax court’s valuation.95 The IRS’s expert had no knowledge of the
PES Transaction, yet his valuation was only $78,297 greater than the
value implied in the PES Transaction.96 In contrast, Taxpayer’s expert
valued the property $2,863,297 higher than the value implied in the
PES Transaction. Neither party challenged the PES Transaction as
being other than an arm’s-length sale.97 Thus, the existence of an arm’slength sale only seventeen days before the donation of the conservation
easement provided strong support for both the highest and best use and
the dollar valuation.98
Additionally, the property was located in an undeveloped rural
area.99 The property lacked mountains and large bodies of water,
containing only two streams which were frequently dry. There was no
hospital in the county, the nearest highway was over thirty miles away,
and the property did not have public water access. Moreover, other
proposed developments in the area had failed. This evidence led the tax
court to determine that Taxpayer’s proposed highest and best use as a
low-density mountain resort was “highly unlikely.”100 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed, noting that “ample evidence” supported the tax court’s
findings and that Taxpayer “fail[ed] woefully to demonstrate clear

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

TOT Prop. Holdings I, 2019 WL 11880554 at *6.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *11.
TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1368.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id. at 1370.
Id.
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error.”101 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the tax
court’s valuation was not clearly erroneous and that the tax court
appropriately upheld the imposition of accuracy-related penalties.102
D. Did the Supervisor’s Cover Letter Satisfy the Supervisory Approval
Requirement?
Finally, the court addressed Taxpayer’s argument that the IRS failed
to comply with the approval requirements for the imposition of
penalties.103 Under section 6751 of the Code,104 the IRS cannot assess a
penalty absent written approval of the recommending individual’s
immediate supervisor, or such appropriately designated superior
officers. No particular form is required; rather, all that the statute
requires is that the assessment be approved (1) in writing and (2) by a
manager—namely, the recommending individual’s immediate
supervisor or higher.105
The tax court concluded that the transmittal letter accompanying the
revenue agent’s report satisfied the approval requirement, and the
Eleventh Circuit agreed.106 The transmittal letter stated that a copy of
the revenue agent’s report was enclosed and that “the report [contains]
all proposed adjustments including facts, law, and conclusion,” and the
revenue agent’s supervisor signed the transmittal letter.107 The
reasonable inference here was that the supervisor who signed the letter
approved the adjustments and penalties proposed in the report.108
Taxpayer could point to no caselaw in support of its argument that the
transmittal letter was insufficient or that alternative documentation
was required.109 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the tax
court’s decision on this issue.110
E. Conclusion
The court’s decision in TOT Property Holdings provides a preview of
what participants in conservation easement transactions can expect to

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1).
Id.; see also PBBM-Rose Hill, 900 F.3d at 213.
TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th at 1372.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 1372–73.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1374.
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experience. The IRS will examine these transactions with close
scrutiny, seeking to strictly apply the law.111 The court has
demonstrated a commitment to narrow construction of the conservation
easement provisions, so taxpayers should expect little wiggle room in
these transactions. Although it remains to be seen how the conservation
easement arena will play out,112 taxpayers can expect this outcome to
embolden the IRS in its efforts to combat attempted abuses.
III. HEWITT V. COMMISSIONER
In Hewitt v. Commissioner,113 the Eleventh Circuit was again called
upon to determine whether the tax court properly denied taxpayers’
deductions arising from donation of a conservation easement.114 Given
that the same regulation at issue in TOT Prop. Holdings II had a major
role in this case, one would have expected a similar result. This time,
however, the taxpayers challenged the validity of the applicable
regulation.115 Concluding that the regulation was invalid, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the tax court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.116
A. Factual Background
David and Tammy Hewitt were residents of Randolph County,
Alabama.117 Beginning in 1997, David Hewitt acquired approximately
232 acres of his family’s farmland from his sister in a series of three
transactions. In 2001, David acquired an additional 25 acres of land
adjacent to the acres acquired from his sister. David used a portion of
these 257 acres (the Property), the total acreage, as a cattle ranch. The
remainder of the Property consisted of wooded areas with steep terrain.
On December 28, 2012, David donated an easement on the Property to
Pelican Coast Conservancy, Inc. The deed granting such easement
contained restrictions aimed at forever retaining the Property
“predominately in its natural condition,” but the Hewitts were
permitted to construct certain improvements on the Property.118

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See generally TOT Prop. Holdings II, 1 F.4th 1354.
See infra Part III.
21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1338–39.
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1339–40.
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The deed contained a section governing judicial extinguishment of
the easement.119 Section 15.1 of the deed provided that the easement
could only be extinguished by appropriate judicial proceedings. If the
easement was appropriately terminated, the donee was entitled to
receive a portion of the extinguishment proceeds “at least equal to the
perpetual conservation restriction’s proportionate value,” which was to
be determined according to section 15.2.120 Section 15.2 of the deed
stated that the donee’s share of the extinguishment proceeds was to be
calculated by subtracting out the value attributable to improvements,
then multiplying the reduced amount by the ratio of the easement’s
value at the time of the grant to the unencumbered Property value at
the time of the grant.121
On their jointly filed federal income tax return for tax year 2012, the
Hewitts reported a charitable contribution deduction for donation of the
easement totaling $2.788 million.122 Due to limitations on charitable
contribution deductions,123 only a portion of the $2.788 million
deduction was properly deductible in tax year 2012.124 The remaining
balance was to be carried forward and deducted in tax years 2013 and
2014, as appropriate.125 The Hewitts’ returns were selected for
examination. In August 2017, the IRS issued a statutory notice of
deficiency disallowing the claimed charitable contribution deduction for
tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014, as well as assessing accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662 of the Code.126
The Hewitts timely petitioned the tax court, challenging the
disallowance of the charitable contribution deductions related to the
donation of the easement.127 In the tax court proceedings, the
Commissioner argued that the deed granting the easement did not
comply with the requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)
(the Extinguishment Regulation), because the formula in section 15.2 of
the deed provided for subtracting the value of improvements when

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1340–41.
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i).
Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1340–41.
Id. at 1341.
Id.; I.R.C. § 6662.
Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1341.
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allocating extinguishment proceeds to the donee.128 The Hewitts argued
that the Extinguishment Regulation was invalid.129
The tax court upheld the Commissioner’s disallowance of the
Hewitts’ charitable contribution deductions.130 It explained that the
Extinguishment Regulation does not permit for the value of
post-donation improvements to be subtracted when allocating
extinguishment proceeds to the donee.131 Thus, the court quickly
determined that the requirements for a deduction were not satisfied
because section 15.2 of the deed provided for subtraction of the value of
post-donation improvements before determining the donee’s share of
extinguishment proceeds.132 Moving on to the validity of the
Extinguishment Regulation, the tax court rejected the Hewitts’
challenge.133
B. Was the Extinguishment Regulation Arbitrary and Capricious for
Failing to Comply with the Administrative Procedure Act
Procedural Requirements?
Because the tax court found that the Hewitts were not liable for
accuracy-related penalties,134 the sole issue before the Eleventh Circuit
was the validity of the Extinguishment Regulation. 135 The Hewitts
argued that the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) received
significant comments in response to its proposed version of the
Extinguishment Regulation, and that the Treasury’s failure to respond
to those comments rendered the Extinguishment Regulation invalid.
The Commissioner asserted that none of the comments mentioned by
the Hewitts were significant and the Treasury was not required to
respond because those comments did not “cast[] doubt on the
regulation’s reasonableness.”136
After giving a brief primer on the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),137 the court began by examining the history of the
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Hewitt v. Comm’r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593, T.C. Memo. 2020-89, at *14–15 (2020).
131. Id. at *14.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *24.
134. Id. at *44.
135. Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1347.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1342–43. The APA generally requires that federal agencies follow
prescribed procedures when issuing regulations that have the force and effect of law. 5
U.S.C. § 551. Agencies must first publish a “notice of proposed rulemaking,” generally in
the Federal Register. Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1342 (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575
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Extinguishment
Regulation.
The
Treasury
proposed
the
Extinguishment Regulation on May 23, 1983.138 The Treasury received
comments from ninety organizations and individuals through more
than 700 pages of commentary.139 Of the ninety commenters, thirteen
commented on the proposed extinguishment provisions.140
The most detailed comment came from the New York Landmarks
Conservancy (NYLC). 141 NYLC urged the Treasury to scrap the
extinguishment proceeds regulation altogether. Specifically, NYLC
claimed that it would thwart the congressional intent behind section
170(h) of the Code by discouraging charitable donations of easements
and noting that the remote possibility of extinguishment rendered the
proposed language unnecessary. NYLC also expressly commented on
the issue of whether the value of post-donation improvements should be
considered when allocating extinguishment proceeds to the donee.
NYLC observed that the proposed language contemplates that the ratio
value used in the allocation formula will remain fixed forever.
Accordingly, this language ignores an appropriate circumstance for
modification of the ratio. NYLC presented mathematical examples
illustrating how the proposed language “would obviously be undesirable
to the prospective donor and would constitute a windfall to the donee
organization.”142
Although NYLC’s comment was the most extensive—and the only
comment to address the post-donation improvement language adopted
in section 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)—several other commenters expressed

U.S. 92, 96 (2015)). After giving notice, the agency must provide the public with an
opportunity to provide comments to the rule by submitting written data, arguments, and
other responses. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. at 96. The agency must consider the
comments received, and significant comments require an agency response. Id. Finally, the
agency must provide a concise statement of the basis for the rule and its purpose when
promulgating the final rule. Id. This statement must provide enough detail to “enable the
reviewing court to see the objections and why the agency reacted to them as it did.”
Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1342 (quoting Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561,
1566 (11th Cir. 1985)). Together, this rulemaking framework provides “‘affected parties
fair warning of potential changes in the law and an opportunity to be heard on those
changes’ while ‘affording the agency a chance to avoid errors and make a more informed
decision.’” Id. at 1343 (quoting Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1816 (2019))
(alteration in original).
138. Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1343 (citing Qualified Conservation Contribution; Proposed
Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 22940 (May 23, 1983)).
139. Id. at 1345.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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concern with the proposed proceeds regulation.143 These comments
ranged from warnings that the regulations would “create a potential
disincentive to the donation of easements,” to concerns that the
regulations would “unnecessarily restrict” the amounts payable to
charitable easement holders.144
In total, seven commenters either criticized or urged caution with
respect to the proposed extinguishment regulations.145 Although the
preamble to the final regulations stated that the Treasury had
“considered . . . all comments regarding the proposed amendments,” the
final rule did not discuss or respond to the NYLC or other commenters
concerning the extinguishment proceeds regulation.146
The Eleventh Circuit then proceeded to discuss the tax court’s
decision in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner,147 which
the tax court relied heavily upon in rejecting the Hewitt’s arguments
regarding the validity of the Extinguishment Regulation.148 In
Oakbrook, the tax court considered a similar challenge to the validity of
the Extinguishment Regulation.149 There, the tax court found the
Treasury’s statement in the preamble that it considered all comments
to be sufficient evidence that the relevant matters were appropriately
considered.150 The tax court characterized NYLC’s comments as a
“supposition that [the] Treasury may reasonably have discounted,”
pointing out that NYLC did not offer a proposed alternative rule and
that its comment specifically addressing post-donation improvements
only accounted for one paragraph out of more than 700 pages of written
commentary received.151 According to the tax court, the broad purpose
statements in the preamble to the final regulations were sufficient to
allow the court to “obvious[ly]” infer the reason for the Treasury’s
actions.152
The Oakbrook decision, however, was not unanimous. 153 In an
opinion concurring in the result, Judge Toro found that the Treasury
failed to respond to all significant comments received in the rulemaking

143.
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146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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Id. at 1345–46.
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1345–46.
Id. at 1346.
154 T.C. 180 (2020).
Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1347 (citing Oakbrook, 154 T.C. at 192).
Oakbrook, 154 T.C. at 193.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 223 (Toro, J., concurring).
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process. He noted that the Treasury’s response to comments received
required only two pages in the Federal Register despite receiving more
than 700 total pages of comments.154 Judge Toro also stated that
NYLC’s comments expressly addressing specific proposed language and
detailing how the purpose of the statute would be thwarted by that
language were significant because they “‘challenge[d] a fundamental
premise’ underlying the proposed [regulation].”155 Similarly, Judge
Holmes found the Treasury’s explanation to be inadequate, noting that
agency responses with even greater detail have been deemed invalid.156
Upon consideration of the agency record, the tax court’s decision in
Oakbrook, and various other precedent, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the Extinguishment Regulation was rendered invalid as an
arbitrary and capricious agency action because the Treasury failed to
respond to significant comments in the final rule.157 In doing so, the
court found its decision in Lloyd Noland Hospital and Clinic v.
Heckler158 to be instructive.159
In Lloyd Noland, the plaintiff argued that a regulation promulgated
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was invalid
because HHS failed to respond to comments questioning the reliability
of a study upon which HHS relied in promulgating the regulation.160
The court held that HHS’s broad purpose statements in the rule’s
preamble were insufficient, explaining that such statements must
provide enough detail for a reviewing court to understand why the
agency responded the way it did.161
The court quickly concluded that the NYLC’s comment to the
proposed Extinguishment Regulation was significant.162 NYLC’s
comments noted that the proposed regulation would thwart
congressional intent and actually discourage donations. The comments
also presented mathematical evidence demonstrating that the proposed
extinguishment proceeds formula would “obviously be undesirable to
the prospective donor and would constitute a windfall to the donee

154. Id. at 221 (Toro, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 216 (Toro, J., concurring) (quoting MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FFCC, 209 F.3d
760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
156. Id. at 245–48 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing Dominion Res., Inc. v. United
States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
157. Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1349–50.
158. 762 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985).
159. Hewitt, 21 F.4th at 1350.
160. Id. (citing Lloyd Noland, 762 F.2d at 1563).
161. Id. (citing Lloyd Noland, 762 F.2d at 1566).
162. Id. at 1351.

2022

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

1271

organization.”163 This comment challenged the fundamental premise of
the proposed regulation, thereby requiring a response from the
Treasury. In rejecting the Commissioner’s argument that the comments
were not significant because they did not “cast doubt on the
reasonableness of the [regulation],” the court observed that NYLC’s
comments warned that the proposed extinguishment proceeds language
would discourage the very donations that Congress sought to encourage
when enacting section 170(h) of the Code.164 By highlighting how the
proposed regulations would counteract the congressional intent, which
was purportedly “reflected” in the final regulations, NYLC did, in fact,
cast doubt upon the reasonableness of the regulation.165
Additionally, the court rejected the Commissioner’s final argument
that the statement in the preamble that “all comments” had been
considered coupled with some minor revisions to the proceeds language
was sufficient and concluded that the revision did not “provide any
indication that [the] Treasury was responding to NYLC’s significant
comment about the post-donation improvements issue.”166
C. Conclusion
Hewitt is an interesting plot twist in the conservation easement saga.
Given the Treasury’s historical position that its regulations were
merely interpretive and, therefore, outside the scope of the APA,167 it is
possible that more Treasury Regulations could be susceptible to
challenge. Will Hewitt serve as an invitation for future taxpayer attacks
on Treasury Regulations? Or will it merely embolden participants in
conservation easement transactions?
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the Code was amended to allow charitable contribution
deductions for qualified conservation contributions, Congress was
aware that the conservation easements presented the potential for

163. Id.
164. Id. at 1351–53.
165. Id. at 1352.
166. Id. at 1353.
167. Id. at 1346–47 (“[A]lthough a notice of proposed rulemaking which solicited public
comments was issued, the Internal Revenue Service concluded when the notice was
issued that the regulations are interpretive and that the notice and public comment
procedure requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 553 [of the APA] did not apply.”) (quoting Income
Taxes; Qualified Conservation Contributions, 51 Fed. Reg. 1496-01, 1498 (Jan. 14, 1986)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20, 25, 602)).
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taxpayer abuse.168 Sure enough, promoters swooped in, marketing
conservation easements as a way for taxpayers to easily reduce their
taxable income. But rather than conserving natural resources and
cultural heritage for public benefit, the syndication-run-amok
environment has caused significant erosion of public trust in private
land conservation, earning conservation easements a spot on the IRS’s
“Dirty Dozen” list of tax scams since 2019.169 In response, the IRS has
since designated certain syndicated conservation easements as listed
transactions which taxpayers must disclose to the IRS;170 announced
increased enforcement activity with “extensive enforcement tools that
employ advanced techniques”;171 and established a new Office of
Promoter Investigations to “coordinate efforts across multiple business
divisions to address abusive syndicated conservation easements.”172
Accordingly, it appears that the IRS will continue to deploy vigorous
enforcement activity in this area.
Faced with increased IRS enforcement activity, how will participants
in conservation easement transactions fare? Will the IRS continue to
enjoy resounding victory as it did in TOT Property Holdings? Or will the
taxpayers find more success, perhaps even borrowing a page from the
Hewitt playbook and challenge the validity of other regulations of the
Commissioner?
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